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Brexit	is	re-making	the	UK’s	constitution	under	our
noses
New	Brexit-based	rules	are	likely	to	impact	on	devolution.	There	is	serious	danger	that	is	re-making	the
UK’s	constitution	under	our	noses,	writes	Daniel	Wincott	(Cardiff	University).	
The	territorial	constitution	is	particularly	fragile.	Pursuing	Brexit,	Theresa	May’s	government	has
stumbled	into	deep	questions	about	devolution.	The	territorial	politics	of	Brexit	is	a	bewildering	mix	of
ignorance,	apparent	disdain,	confrontation,	cooperation	and	collaboration.	Rarely	have	the	so-called
devolution	‘settlements’	appeared	more	unsettled.
The	UK’s	system	for	intergovernmental	relations	(IGR)	between	devolved	and	UK	governments	has	been	hidden	in
obscurity.	Arcane	processes	–	Legislative	Consent	Memoranda	(LCMs	–	also	known	as	Sewel	Motions)	and	Joint
Ministerial	Committees	(JMCs)	–	are	now	more	widely	discussed.	Brexit	has	revealed	limits	and	weaknesses	in
existing	devolution	structures.	UK	IGR	is	an	unappetizing	spaghetti	of	abstruse	acronyms,	but	compared	to	other
multi-level	states	it	is	also	remarkably	informal	and	limited.	Opportunities	to	develop	the	system	may	emerge,	but	it
could	also	collapse	under	the	pressure	of	leaving	the	EU.	New	Brexit-based	rules	are	likely	to	impact	on	devolution.
After	a	long	static	period,	they	are	now	coming	thick	and	fast.	Engaging	with	these	issues	is	challenging	–	Brexit	and
devolution	can	both	be	bafflingly	complicated.	Efforts	are	being	made	to	support	and	co-ordinate	this	engagement.
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Negotiating	the	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Act	2018
The	Withdrawal	Act,	given	Royal	Assent	on	26	June	2018,	is	a	key	plank	of	UK	Brexit	strategy.	Essentially,	the	Act
domesticates	much	EU	law,	‘retaining’	it	as	part	of	domestic	law.The	Act	strengthens	the	UK	government,	providing
the	executive	with	wide-ranging	power	to	issue	secondary	legislation,	or	Statutory	Instruments	(SIs).	800-1000	SIs
are	anticipated.	Their	range	and	depth	suggests	Theresa	May	expects	serious	challenges,	but	Whitehall	cannot	yet
predict	fully	what	form	they	will	take.	The	process	of	issuing	SIs	under	the	Act	began	in	July	2018.	Typically,	the	time
and	scope	to	scrutinize	them	is	limited.
LSE Brexit: Brexit is re-making the UK’s constitution under our noses Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-09-17
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/09/17/brexit-is-re-making-the-uks-constitution-under-our-noses/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
As	first	drafted,	the	Withdrawal	Bill	proposed	to	sweep	up	and	centralize	powers	at	the	expense	of	the	devolved
political	systems.	Essentially,	it	sought	to	move	all	areas	of	retained	EU	law	–	including	in	devolved	policy	areas	–	to
Westminster.	The	UK	government	seems	hardly	to	have	noticed	that	its	proposal	to	accumulate	these	powers	would
ride	roughshod	over	devolution.	Politicians	in	Wales	and	Scotland	saw	the	proposals	as	a	power	grab.	Neither
devolved	legislature	gave	consent	for	the	Westminster	legislation.	Both	passed	alternative	devolved	‘continuity’
legislation.
Since	September	2017	intensive,	if	sometimes	frustrating,	discussions	have	taken	place	between	governments	in
Cardiff,	Edinburgh	and	London.	Initially	convened	by	Damian	Green,	subsequently,	David	Lidington	led	the
discussions	for	the	UK	government.	Mark	Drakeford	and	Mike	Russell	represented	Wales	and	Scotland,	respectively.
Ultimately,	the	UK	government	redrafted	the	legislation	to	acknowledge	what	most	Scottish	and	Welsh	politicians	see
as	a	key	principle	of	the	territorial	constitution:	where	policy	was	already	devolved,	EU	law	should	return	to	the
devolved	institutions,	not	Westminster.	These	changes	persuaded	the	Welsh	Government	to	change	its	view	and
consent	to	the	Withdrawal	Act.	At	the	same	time,	the	Act	provides	for	restrictions	on	the	exercise	of	some	important
devolved	powers	for	up	to	seven	years.	It	gives	London	the	authority	to	write	the	rules	in	the	restricted	areas.	Debate
over	its	devolution	provisions	–	or	more	precisely	the	lack	of	time	for	debate	–	generated	acrimony	at	Westminster.
Ultimately,	the	Scottish	government	did	not	feel	the	change	had	gone	far	enough,	and	withheld	consent.
The	contrasting	Welsh	and	Scottish	positions	on	the	Withdrawal	Act	make	perfect	sense.	The	devolutionist	but
ultimately	pro-UK	Welsh	government	has	sought	to	‘bank’	gains	made	from	the	initial	position	on	the	Withdrawal	Bill.
The	SNP	government	in	Scotland	takes	a	more	robust	view.	Independence	is	their	ultimate	objective.	They	operate
with	a	stronger	form	of	devolution,	have	a	separate,	established	legal	system	and	lead	a	country	with	a	referendum
majority	for	Remain.
The	UK’s	intergovernmental	system
The	UK’s	devolved	system	was	carefully	constructed	to	ensure	that	the	devolved	policies	could	not	breach	EU	law.
As	with	Westminster,	EU	laws	and	principles	run	right	through	the	fabric	of	devolution.	The	framework	it	provided	for
devolution	was	an	unintended	benefit	of	EU	membership	–	a	kind	of	scaffolding	that	has	helped	to	support	and	hold
together	the	parts	of	the	UK.	EU	membership	has	allowed	devolved	authorities	to	pursue	distinct	policies	within	a
shared	framework	set	outside	the	UK.
Such	as	it	was,	that	system	was	heavily	based	on	JMCs.	They	ranged	from	a	plenary	meeting	of	the	Prime	Minister
and	devolved	First	Ministers	–	JMC(P)	–	to	meetings	of	specialist	ministers	in	particular	policy	fields.	But	except	for
EU	matters,	no	specialist	formation	has	survived.	JMC(E)	–	for	EU	policy	–	was	much	the	most	active	committee,
until	it	was	superseded	by	the	European	Negotiations	Committee	(JMC(EN)).
At	most,	JMC(P)	has	met	once	a	year.	And	there	were	years	–	2002-2008	and	then	from	late	2015	until	towards	the
end	of	2017	–	when	it	did	not	meet.	Even	the	relatively	active	European	JMCs	have	not	met	at	all	for	significant
periods	–	the	JMC(E)	from	late	2015	to	late	2016;	the	JMC(EN)	from	February	2017,	shortly	after	its	creation,	to
September	2017.	Even	when	JMC(EN)	meetings	were	called,	the	UK	government	sometimes	seemed	unprepared	to
meet.	Sometimes	the	Welsh	participants	left	Cardiff	for	London	without	knowing	precisely	where	the	meeting	was	to
be	held.
Eventually,	the	JMC(EN)	made	progress.	Alongside	changes	to	the	Withdrawal	legislation,	novel	machinery	for	IGR
started	to	take	shape.	A	new	Ministerial	Forum	emerged	below	the	JMC.	And	even	after	it	became	clear	agreement
between	Westminster	and	Holyrood	was	not	achievable,	Lidington	‘put	on	record	that	…	the	Scottish	Government
has	engaged	for	many	months	in	a	very	constructive	fashion’.
Yet,	as	the	Withdrawal	Bill	went	through	its	final	stages,	a	sense	of	déjà	vu	took	hold.	Hostility	and	mutual
incomprehension,	not	constructive	engagement	seemed	to	be	the	order	of	the	day.	Some	accused	Lidington	of
talking	away	any	time	to	debate	the	devolution	issues.	They	walked	out	of	the	Commons.	Conservative	MPs	laughed
them	out	of	the	chamber,	calling	the	walk-out	a	stunt.	In	defiance	of	convention,	May’s	government	pressed	ahead	to
pass	the	Act	without	Scottish	consent.
After	the	Withdrawal	Act
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There	is	much	more	Brexit	legislation	to	come.	Neither	Wales	nor	Scotland	have	consented	to	the	Trade	Bill.	Having
been	overridden	on	the	Withdrawal	Act,	the	Scottish	Government	is	clear	it	will	not	give	consent	to	further	Brexit
legislation	on	Agriculture	or	Fisheries.	Withdrawal	Act	SIs	are	flooding	through	the	system.
Scotland	and	Wales	parted	ways	over	the	Withdrawal	Act.	Shortly	after	it	passed,	Theresa	May	held	a	Cabinet
meeting	at	Chequers	–	and	issued	a	White	Paper	on	the	UK’s	future	relationship	with	the	EU.	Despite	assurances,
the	devolved	governments	had	not	been	consulted	on	these	plans.	If	the	Withdrawal	Act	divided	Wales	from
Scotland,	the	White	Paper	brought	them	back	together.	Where	their	interests	align,	the	two	governments	are	able	to
collaborate.
Brexit	places	devolution	at	risk.	Care,	goodwill	and	constructive	engagement	is	needed	from	all	sides,	if	a	workable
system	of	devolution	is	to	emerge	after	the	UK	leaves	the	EU.	New	pressures	are	emerging	which	inherited
structures	and	attitudes	will	not	be	able	to	overcome.	New	institutions,	relationships	and	–	most	of	all	–	mentalities
need	to	be	nurtured.	Otherwise,	we	could	become	trapped	in	a	repeating	cycle	of	periods	of	effective	collaboration	on
the	one	hand	and	episodes	of	hostility,	mutual	incomprehension	and	disdain	on	the	other.	Devolution	could	face	déjà
vu	all	over	again.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	neither	those	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog	nor	of	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared
on	the	Welsh	Brexit	blog.
Daniel	Wincott	is	Blackwell	Professor	of	Law	and	Society	and	ESRC	Leadership	Fellow	for	Governance	and	Brexit
Research	(ES/R007500/1).	His	work	is	also	supported	by	the	ESRC	‘Between	two	Unions’	Project	(ES/P009441/1).	
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